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INTRODUCTION
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has been 
a global health crisis not seen since World War Two.1 The World 
Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 
11, 2020,2 and as of March 2021, just 1 year later, there have 
been over 126 million confirmed cases and more than 2.7 mil-
lion deaths worldwide.3
Conventional quarantine systems for responding to infectious 
diseases consist of restricting exchanges between countries 
through quarantine, monitoring indicators, such as infection 
and mortality rates, for diseases, and designing a surveillance 
system based on scientific evidence.4,5 However, in 2005, In-
ternational Health Regulations were revised to establish a new 
global infectious disease management system, and precau-
tionary controls to manage unknown, unpredictable, and sud-
denly emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) were emphasized.6-8 
According thereto, EIDs are to be controlled by preemptive re-
sponses of “early detection” (detecting signals, verification, and 
risk assessment and alert) and “rapid action” (epidemiological 
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investigation, isolation and quarantine, and risk communica-
tion).9 However, due to global changes, including increased 
trade, globalization, and urbanization, EIDs are now able to 
spread rapidly across borders.10,11 Therefore, preventing or over-
coming global crises relies heavily using a systematic transna-
tional approach, public-private partnerships, and state-of-the-
art technology early on during an epidemic.12-14
The government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) has supple-
mented legal systems and governance to address the COVID-19 
pandemic, building on its past experiences with public health 
crises.15-18 Coordinated governmental responses, testing on a 
massive scale, and prompt contact tracing and quarantine in 
the initial stages of the epidemic have been regarded as success-
ful.19 The ROK has several characteristics that make this possible: 
a national identification number system that can facilitate the 
integration and management of data related to testing, trac-
ing, and treatment and a health care environment in which all 
citizens are covered by national health insurance. However, the 
private sector leads the supply of medical care, thus necessi-
tating strong public-private cooperation.
From September 2020 to July 2021, with support from the 
Asian Development Bank, we investigated and compared the 
COVID-19 response systems of the ROK, Singapore and Taipei, 
China. Based on our findings, we are developing a platform to 
support knowledge exchange for rapid responses to health 
emergencies and to share sustainable health management solu-
tions across Asia. Initially, we conducted a case study on how 
the ROK has managed the COVID-19 pandemic. The present ar-
ticle outlines crisis response systems based on governance and 
how the ROK has used public-private partnerships and informa-
tion technology for COVID-19 management.
GOVERNENCE FOR INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE CRISIS
Establishment of a national infectious disease 
management system
The ROK has tested several preparedness plans for public 
health emergencies due to infectious diseases from overseas, 
including severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (2003), 
influenza A (H1N1) (2009). and Middle East respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) (2015).15,16 Based on these 
experiences, the government enacted the Infectious Disease 
Control and Prevention Act (revised by integrating the Com-
municable Diseases Protection Act and Parasite Diseases Pre-
vention Act of December 29, 2009; Enforcing Decrees of Infec-
tious Case Control and Prevention as a subordinate statute), 
and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) establishes 
and updates comprehensive and systematic plans for the pre-
vention and control of infectious diseases (hereinafter referred 
to as “master plans”) every 5 years based on Article 7 of this Act 
(Table 1).20,21 Meanwhile, local governments established and 
implemented enforcement plans for the prevention and man-
agement of infectious diseases in their municipalities. The pri-
mary purposes of enacting this law and the master plans were 
to ensure systematic quarantine activities across national and 
local governments and to reinforce links between them by 
suggesting basic goals and directions for the prevention and 
control of infectious diseases. A national infectious disease 
management system was consequently developed to effectively 
prevent the transmission of EID outbreaks. The main elements 
were as follows: 1) declaration and report, 2) surveillance and 
epidemiological investigation, 3) vaccination, 4) blocking the 
transmission of infection, and 5) prevention.22,23 In addition, the 
government of the ROK created a standard manual (National 
Table 1. First and Second Plans for Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases
1st plan 2nd plan
Period 2013–2017 2018–2022
Vision Protecting the public’s safety and health by combating infectious 
diseases
Safe society without worrying about infectious diseases
Purpose Fighting infectious diseases and suppressing epidemics
Suppressing the inflow of infectious diseases from overseas
Minimizing damage by strengthening the ability to respond to 
new infectious diseases
Reinforcing early detection of infectious diseases and rapid response
Preventing and managing infectious disease risk factors
Strengthening infectious disease management organization and system
Main tasks Improvement of initial response ability
Expansion of vaccination support
Building capacity to prepare for and respond to public health crises
Improvement of patient safety and advanced medical-related 
infection management
Customize disease-specific response and risk communication
Promote international cooperation
Fostering the bio-industry based on disease management and 
contributing to the creative economy
Reinforcement of infectious disease response and preparation system/ 
infrastructure
Establishment of “one health” cooperation system
Strengthen infectious disease prevention and management measures
Building a technology innovation platform to response for infectious 
diseases
This table is a modified version of the original as presented in the ADB publication “Assessment of COVID-19 Response in the Republic of Korea” (http://dx.doi.
org/10.22617/TCS210133-2).
779
Woojin Kim, et al.
https://doi.org/10.3349/ymj.2021.62.9.777
Security Council/MOHW, 2004) for risk management that can 
be used to respond to an outbreak of an infectious disease. This 
manual was prepared to prevent damage to public health by 
suggesting actions for a pan-governmental crisis management 
system and individual government institutions during an infec-
tious disease crisis.24
Under the crisis management response system, outbreaks 
of EIDs are to be managed through a crisis alert system classi-
fied into four levels (“Level 1” to “Level 4”) depending on the 
scale and rate of transmission. The system provides individual 
guidance about actions to be taken by central and local govern-
ments (Fig. 1). The main response principles at each level are 
monitoring of international situations and outbreak prepared-
ness (at level 1), strong initial response and enhanced surveil-
lance (at level 2), and establishment of a pan-government co-
operation system (at levels 3–4).25 The basic goals of the crisis 
management response system are as follows: 1) preparedness 
for pandemic disasters; 2) effective responses and blocking of 
further transmission; and 3) prompt, accurate, and transparent 
disclosure of information to address public anxiety.26
Improvement of legal systems in response to infectious disease 
crisis
After the global pandemic of SARS in 2003 and influenza A 
(H1N1) in 2009, the government of the ROK established a legal 
mechanism that aims to “prevent outbreaks and epidemics of 
infectious diseases that are harmful to public health and stip-
ulate measures necessary for their prevention and manage-
ment.”27 Based on International Health Regulations announced 
in 2005, the government legislated a reorganization of laws 
and regulations related to infectious diseases under the Infec-
tious Disease Control and Prevention Act (2010) and estab-
lished an Infectious Disease Control Committee (Table 2).27,28 
However, during the MERS outbreak of 2015, the infectious 
disease response system did not function efficiently, and as a 
result, 186 confirmed cases and 38 deaths were reported in the 
ROK.29 During that period, failure to quarantine super-spread-
ers, inadequate hospital infection management, poor crisis 
communication from the central government, and spread of 
misinformation not only stirred distrust and anxiety among the 
public, but also increased the number of infected people.30,31 In 
June 2015, the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act 
was revised to ensure transparency and rapidness of informa-
tion transfer and the efficient allocation of materials and hu-
man resources (Fig. 2).32
Allowing for transparent disclosure of information and cen-
tralized control management, this act helped enable a success-
ful response in the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak.33 In 
order to respond to the ongoing crisis, the government has 
sought to further strengthen the national quarantine manage-
ment system by revising laws to reflect the opinions of experts 
in the field. Their first legislative step on February 2020 was to 
amend three legal acts: the Infectious Disease Control and Pre-
vention Act, the Quarantine Act, and the Medical Service Act.34 
Fig. 1. National infectious disease risk alert levels in the Republic of Korea. This figure is a modified version of the original as presented in the ADB publi-
cation “Assessment of COVID-19 Response in the Republic of Korea” (http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/TCS210133-2). KDCA, Korea Disease Control and Preven-
tion Agency; MOHW, Ministry of Health and Welfare; MOSPA, Ministry of Security and Public Administration.
780
COVID-19 Response in the Republic of Korea
https://doi.org/10.3349/ymj.2021.62.9.777
The second step was undertaken in August, wherein a bill for 
the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act was passed.35 
On September 2020, the bill was revised, taking into account 
increases in travel during the holiday season and increases in 
patient numbers in the winter (Fig. 2).36
The Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act enables 
efficient and effective management of infectious diseases 
through its articles on “Duties of State and Local governments, 
Medical Personnel, and Citizens, as well as Citizens’ Rights,” 
“Designation of Facilities for Quarantining Contacts,” “Stockpil-
ing Medicines and Equipment,” and “Request for Provision and 
Verification of Information.” It is further used as legal grounds 
for supporting those who are facing hardships due to COVID-19 
through its articles on “Protection Measures for Persons Vulner-
able,” “Compensation for Losses,” “Subsidization to Medical 
Persons and Founders of Medical Institutions,” and “Liveli-
hood Assistance for Patients with Infectious Diseases.”20
Central government-led and local government networks in 
a public-private partnership
The Korean medical system has a distinctive feature in that most 
medical care is provided by private medical institutions.22,37 
During the influenza A (H1N1) epidemic, the government of 
the ROK struggled with a lack of experienced experts who could 
manage regional organizations dealing with infectious disease 
or who could support the response strategies of the Korea Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention [promoted to the Ko-
rea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) in 2020; 
hereinafter referred to as KDCA]. Accordingly, the government 
aimed to strengthen local responses in case of an infectious dis-
ease by establishing a public health care system that can man-
age infectious diseases through public-private partnerships.38,39 
In addition to the Minister of Health and Welfare, the heads 
of a metropolitan/province in the ROK may establish an orga-
nization supporting infectious disease control projects that 
includes private professionals in order to support the imple-
mentation of master plans under Article 8 of the Infectious Dis-
ease Control and Prevention Act.20 As well, local governments 
Table 2. Major Enactments and Revisions of Infectious Disease-Related Laws
Enactment/ 
amendment
Infectious disease control and prevention act Quarantine act Medical service act
December 30, 2010 
(enforcement)
Integration of laws related to infectious diseases
Expansion of the legal communicable disease (notifiable disease)
Inclusion of diseases that cannot be transmitted from person-to-
person
Inclusion of nosocomial infections and multidrug-resistant infectious 
diseases
Establishment of “Infectious diseases under surveillance by 
the World Health Organization”
Establishment and composition of the Infectious Disease Control 
Committee (by the MOHW)
July 6, 2015 Establishment of a prompt and effective response system 
for combating infectious diseases
Release of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases
Clarification of the obligation of patients and rationales for 
compensation
February 26, 2020 Responsive measures for suspected patients
Regulation of the flow of medical supplies abroad
Strengthening overall capacity for epidemiological investigation
Establishing of a legal basis for 
requesting the prohibition of 
entry or departure of persons 
infected or suspected of 
being infected with an 
infectious disease
Effective monitoring of 
infections within healthcare or 
medical facilities
August 4, 2020 Imposing compliance with preventive measures against infectious 
disease and enabling imposition of fines for negligence
Making foreign-returned infected people defray treatment expenses
Differentiating the level of treatment on the basis of disease severity
September 25, 2020 Heads of local governments granted authority to order the suspension 
of operation of facilities or places that have the potential for 
transmission of infectious disease and that do not comply with the 
enforced preventive measures
Establish a legal basis for monitoring infected persons 
in quarantine
MOHW, Ministry of Health and Welfare.
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Fig. 2. Timeline of legislative changes for the management of emerging infectious diseases in the Republic of Korea. This figure is a modified version of 
the original as presented in the ADB publication “Assessment of COVID-19 Response in the Republic of Korea” (http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/TCS210133-2). 
SARS, Severe acute respiratory syndrome; KCDC, Korea Centers for Disease Control; MERS, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome; KDCA, Korea Disease 
Control and Prevention Agency.
are able to operate under the Center for Infectious Disease 
Control and Prevention (CIDC), a regional organization for 
strengthening infectious disease management, wherein local 
governments can commission CIDCs to a university or medical 
institution within the region. The center is composed of private 
experts with abundant expertise and experience in the preven-
tion and management of infectious diseases, as well as in epi-
demiological investigation and quarantine. The experts at CI-
DCs provide advice and support to local governments for the 
management of infectious diseases.40,41 The CIDC was first es-
tablished in Seoul in 2012, and the central government has ex-
panded it to 17 metropolitans and provinces nationwide as of 
August 2020.42,43
CIDCs play a key role in governance and act as important fa-
cilitators of infectious disease management in each metropoli-
tan and province of Korea.44 Their functions include infectious 
disease outbreak simulation training, establishment of re-
sponse systems suitable for regional characteristics, develop-
ment of education and training programs, and operation of lo-
cal community expert networks.45 In the event of a crisis, it is 
converted into an organization that supports prompt responses 
to local epidemics via surveillance, epidemiological investiga-
tion, education, and facility management. In the current COV-
ID-19 outbreak, CIDCs are currently being used as an outlet for 
cooperation between public-private sectors, for supporting on-
site responses, for assessing latest research trends on COVID-19, 
and for countermeasure meetings with experts in the region 
as part of a response and consultation system.42,46
Government systems for responding to COVID-19 
Installation and operation of a disaster “control tower”: 
Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters
When the crisis warning level of COVID-19 was raised to Level 
4 on February 23, 2020, the government of the ROK assembled 
the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters 
(CDSCHQ), a response system headed by the Prime Minister 
for wider responses at the national level (Fig. 3).47 The CD-
SCHQ is the government’s highest emergency countermea-
sure organization, established by the Ministry of Public Ad-
ministration and Security under Article 14 of the Framework 
Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety. The agency 
deals with matters related to the prevention, preparation, re-
sponse, and recovery from large-scale disasters.48 This is the 
second time an infectious disease-related CDSCHQ has been 
installed since the influenza A (H1N1) outbreak of November 
2009.49 The two vice heads of the CDSCHQ assist the Central 
Disease Control Headquarters operated by the KDCA to pro-
vide necessary assistance. The first vice head serves as the Head 
of the Central Disaster Management Headquarters (Minister of 
Health and Welfare) and focuses on preventive measures and 
quarantine tasks, and the second vice head, the Head of Pan-
government Countermeasures Support Headquarters (Minis-
ter of Interior and Safety), is responsible for coordination be-
tween central and local governments.47 Under the CDSCHQ, 
local disaster and safety management headquarters are estab-
lished by local governments. The heads of local governments 
collaborate to ensure the provision of adequate numbers of per-
sonnel, beds, and supplies, joining forces with local Infectious 
Disease Prevention and Control Teams (under Article 16 of the 
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Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety).48
Regional quarantine task force: Central Disease Control 
Headquarters-Central Disaster Management Headquarters
In accordance with the Infectious Disease Control and Pre-
vention Act and its enforcement ordinances, central and indi-
vidual metropolitan-province or city-county governments 
should normally operate epidemiological investigation teams 
(30 or more in central teams and 20 or more in metropolitan-
province or city-county teams).20,40 Among these, local (metro-
politan-province or city-county) epidemiological investigation 
teams are responsible for, in each jurisdiction, formulating 
and implementing an epidemiological investigation plan, re-
porting the findings of epidemiological investigations to upper 
regional teams, and collecting and analyzing cases of outbreak 
and prevalence of infectious diseases. Metropolitan-province 
teams are to provide technical guidance for and evaluation of 
city-county teams.40 Each epidemiological investigation team 
is to employ epidemiological investigators (a metropolitan-
province team has two or more, one of which is a doctor, while 
a city-county team has one or more) who is in charge of epide-
miological investigation-related tasks: formulating plans, con-
ducting and analyzing the findings of research on infectious dis-
eases, developing criteria and methods, and providing technical 
guidance, education, and training on epidemiological investi-
gations teams (under Article 60-2 of the Infectious Disease 
Control and Prevention Act and Article 15, 16, and 26 of the En-
forcement Decree of the Infectious Disease Control and Pre-
vention Act).20,40
When the crisis warning level is raised to Level 3, Local Di-
saster and Safety Management Headquarters are to be created 
in areas where the epidemic has occurred. These form and 
support field-specific teams for quarantine, medical support, 
epidemiological investigations, living support, and on-site 
control. Local governments participate in providing adminis-
trative support, from test result management to the supervision 
of the environment, facilities, and resources. The government 
of each city and county is to provide an accurate account of the 
number of available sickbeds, hospitals, and medical resourc-
es, including negative pressure rooms and intensive care units. 
This gathered information can be shared between cities and 
counties, allowing local governments to handle the outbreak 
of infectious diseases (Fig. 3).47,50
Regional governing bodies can respond to the pandemic by 
establishing and operating a city- or county-wide rapid response 
team within the local quarantine task force (Fig. 3). They consist 
of at least five to seven people, including an epidemic control 
officer, epidemiological investigation officers, a database man-
ager, an administrator, and, if necessary, an inspection man-
ager.51 These city-county rapid response teams play a vital role 
when a patient is confirmed to have disease. In the event of an 
outbreak of an infectious disease in the community, they per-
form duties, such as appropriate situation assessment, emer-
gency measures, on-site control, and epidemiological investi-
gation. Any public health center that has confirmed a case is to 
immediately conduct a contact investigation under the direc-
tion of the response team. Furthermore, the city-county rapid 
response teams is responsible for determining whether to close 
community facilities or health care facilities that may pose a 
significant risk of infection through a risk assessment.51
The head of a medical institution in which a COVID-19 case 
(including death) has been recorded must report instances 
Fig. 3. Response system upon an infectious disease disaster crisis.
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thereof to the head of a competent public health clinic (under 
Article 11 of the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act). 
Such notifications should be immediately reported to the Di-
rector of the KDCA and competent metropolitan/province gov-
erning bodies of a city/county (under Article 13 of the Infec-
tious Disease Control and Prevention Act).20,51 On March 19, 
2020, the Central Disease Control Headquarter established the 
“COVID-19 Patient Management Information System” (http://
covid19.kdca.go.kr) to quickly identify confirmed cases and pa-
tient conditions.52 The system allows a city and county to be in-
formed of cases of infectious disease and enables the KDCA to 
implement integrated management strategies.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
FOR COVID-19 RESPONSES BASED 




In January 2020, as soon as the gene sequence of the disease-
causing virus was released, the KDCA began the develop-
ment, verification, and evaluation of a real-time polymerase 
chain reaction (RT-PCR) diagnostic method in collaboration 
with the Korean Society for Laboratory Medicine and the Ko-
rean Association of External Quality Assessment Service. The 
first diagnostic kit was released 3 weeks after the establish-
ment of public-private cooperation, and the new test method 
could provide confirmed results within 6 hours, unlike the “pan-
Corona test method,” which took 1–2 days.53,54 The KDCA im-
mediately released the newly developed test method to domes-
tic reagent manufacturers and allowed private companies to 
produce diagnostic kits.55 In addition, the Ministry of Food and 
Drug Safety quickly provided emergency use authorization 
(EUA) for the kit, making it available to private medical institu-
tions in February 2020.56,57
The RT-PCR diagnostic method developed in the ROK was 
approved as a draft international standard by the Internation-
al Organization for Standardization/Technical Committee 212 
(ISO/TC 212) in February and was established as an interna-
tional standard in December 2020 after final approval from all 
member countries.58,59 Additionally, according to the perfor-
mance ranking of the COVID-19 Molecular Diagnosis Kit re-
leased by the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(USFDA) on December 7, 2020, two Korean products were in-
cluded among the top 12 products with a limit of detection 
(LoD) of 600 NDU/mL or less. The ranking was calculated by 
comparing LoDs returned after the USFDA provided standard 
samples and standard operating procedures directly to 197 
molecular diagnostic kit developers around the world to accu-
rately compare the performance of EUA-approved diagnostic 
kits. The USFDA has released a performance ranking of 181 
COVID-19 molecular diagnostic kits from companies that have 
sent their results.60
By using self-developed diagnostic test methods, the ROK 
was able to perform more than 20000 tests a day in early March 
2020.53 Massive diagnosis enabled early detection, rapid isola-
tion of confirmed cases, and reduced transmission.61 This ag-
gressive testing capability was made possible due to active par-
ticipation from the private sector and rapid approval of the tests 
by the Korean Food and Drug Administration, which eventually 
facilitated earlier and more effective containment of infections 
relative to that in other countries.62
Screening centers
In order to detect COVID-19 patients early and to prevent in-
fections, the government of the ROK and medical institutions 
have established and been operating screening centers where 
patients with suspected symptoms receive separate treatment 
before visiting a hospital. However, as the number of suspected 
and/or symptomatic individuals to be tested has increased, a 
need for a safe and efficient COVID-19 screening system has aris-
en. For this purpose, drive-thru screening centers have been de-
signed and implemented from February 2020.63 The users can 
receive diagnostic tests by moving the car in flow of “Entrance–
Registration–Examination–Specimen collection–Instructions–
Exit,” without them having to leave their cars. In the drive-thru 
screening center system, the time required for ventilation and 
cleaning of the examination room is shortened, improving the 
efficiency of the inspection. Drive-thru screening, including 
registration, testing, collection, and instruction, requires about 
10 minutes, which is about a third of the time for typical screen-
ing. In addition, drive-thru screening systems can eliminate 
the risk of cross-infection, since each vehicle acts as an isolator 
throughout the test process.64 Thus, the accessibility of diagnos-
tic tests for patients has been improved, and large-scale rapid 
diagnostic testing has been made possible.64,65 The Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Energy and the MOHW submitted an inter-
national standard to the ISO in April 2020 for drive-thru screen-
ing to become an international standard, which was adopted as 
a new work item proposal in August 2020.66
Drug Utilization Review & International Traveler 
Information System
The Drug Utilization Review (DUR) system, supported by the 
Health Insurance Review and Assessment service (HIRA), is a 
service system that provides a patient’s medication history in 
real time to doctors or pharmacists.67 This system enables the 
operation of a national drug monitoring network by reporting 
real-time usage history of drugs while supporting the safe use 
of drugs in normal times.68 When a doctor transmits a patient’s 
prescription information to the system in the treatment process, 
the  medication history of the patient is checked in real time, 
and if an abnormal drug is prescribed, a warning message ap-
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pears on the doctor’s monitor screen within 0.5 seconds. The 
same process occurs when a pharmacist prepares medicine.67 
Meanwhile, the International Traveler Information System 
(ITS), which was built into the DUR by the KDCA for rapid ini-
tial responses to infectious diseases during the MERS outbreak 
in 2015, can help with early diagnosis of infectious diseases as 
it is linked with electronic medical records to provide informa-
tion on patients with a history of visiting a contaminated area.68,69 
These systems also provide entry information on visitors from 
overseas within the last 14 days to screening centers or medi-
cal institutions.69 In addition, information on release from 
quarantine after confirmation (provision period: 14 days) and 
the contact history of confirmed patients (provision period: 21 
days) can be checked at medical institutions through the DUR/
ITS system.70 With such information available, more efficient 
and accurate testing is possible.71 The legal basis for the provi-
sion of information using ITS·DUR includes Article 76-2 of the 
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act and Article 47-2 
of Enforcement Decree of the Infectious Disease Control and 
Prevention Act.20,40
National support of expenses for diagnosis and treatment
As rapid testing and treatment are required to prevent the spread 
of COVID-19, all expenses for testing, quarantine, and treat-
ment are, in accordance with the Infectious Disease Control and 
Prevention Act, covered by national health insurance, the cen-
tral government, and local governments.20
Financial support for diagnostic tests is targeted to individ-
uals with suspicious symptoms of infection, those who have 
been in contact with a confirmed case, those who have entered 
the country from abroad, and those who have visited high-risk 
areas. Anyone who does not meet the above criteria but wants 
a screening test must pay a fee of $142 for the test (under Arti-
cles 4 and 67 of the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention 
Act).20,72 This is about 5% of the total monthly average wage of 
a Korean wage worker ($3,062 as of March 2020).73 However, if 
the test results are “positive,” the costs of the test are refunded.74 
However, in areas where the second stage of social distancing 
(middle of five stages) is being implemented due to the spread 
of infection, local governments can conduct active quarantine 
by conducting free diagnostic tests for asymptomatic residents 
(under Articles 70–4 and 28–5 of the Infectious Disease Con-
trol and Prevention Act).20,51,74
Tracing and tracking
Entrance registration and tracing through mobile phones: 
Korea Internet Pass (KI-PASS)
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, several cases of mass trans-
mission have occurred at publicly used facilities where multi-
ple people gather. Accordingly, the Infectious Disease Control 
Agency has ordered records of visitors to facilities with an un-
specified number of people under Article 49-2 of the Infectious 
Disease Control and Prevention Act, from March 22, 2020.20,75 
However, in an epidemiological investigation of mass trans-
missions in an entertainment facility in May 2020, only 41% of 
the visitors on the guestbook provided correct contact informa-
tion. Thus, the MOHW has developed and used a digital cus-
tomer register system (KI-PASS, http://kipass.co.kr/) to support 
accurate and quick epidemiological investigation of COVID-19, 
based on a Quick Response (QR) code, since June 10, 2020.75 
When a high-risk facility user scans a QR code through a ter-
minal when entering, the entry date, entry time, and contact 
information (name is not collected) can be collected.76 The le-
gal bases for the collection of personal information are stipu-
lated under Articles 15 and 17 of the Personal Information 
Protection Act.20,77 Collected data are only used for tracking 
movement in epidemiological investigations and are discard-
ed after 4 weeks of collection.75
Epidemiological investigation support systems: COVID-19 
Smart Management System
The main purpose of an epidemiological investigation is to 
quickly determine whether an infectious disease has occurred 
and to identify infection sources and transmission processes.78 
When an EID appears, the KDCA forms a rapid response team 
and takes charge of quarantine. The response team conducts 
epidemiological investigations of confirmed patients and tracks 
movement routes through credit cards, cellphone GPS, and 
closed-circuit television (CCTV) records.79
After large-scale spread of COVID-19, the need for comput-
erization of the epidemiological investigation process emerged 
because of the expansive work of epidemiological investiga-
tors and the resulting delay in quarantine activities: convention-
al epidemiological investigations were conducted by contacting 
an individual via the telephone, recording a handwritten note, 
and sending official documents, making it was difficult to 
quickly investigate a large number of subjects. Accordingly, the 
KDCA proposed establishing a system with which to quickly 
and accurately conduct epidemiological investigations.55,80 In 
result, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MO-
LIT) designed the COVID-19 Smart Management System (SMS) 
using “Smart City Data Processing Platform Technology,” which 
was previously being researched and developed by leveraging 
a data hub maintained by the Korean National Strategic Smart 
City Program.81
This system (officially started on March 26, 2020) provides a 
means with which to check the routes of confirmed cases and 
large-scale outbreak areas in real time using big data established 
in connection with 28 organizations, including the MOLIT, 
Ministry of Science and Technology Information and Commu-
nication, National Police Agency, KDCA, three telecommuni-
cations companies, Credit Finance Association, and 22 credit 
card companies. Data related to personal movement provided 
to the epidemiological investigators include cell phone loca-
tion data; the use of debit cards, ATMs, and credit cards; and 
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CCTV images. In addition, the movement of a confirmed 
case is automatically displayed on a map, enabling contact 
identification.55,80,81 Using this system, investigators are able to 
secure information of use during an epidemiological investiga-
tion with speed and accuracy. The identification of a route of a 
confirmed case, which took approximately 24 h before the use 
of SMS, can be completed within 10 min. Furthermore, by con-
verting the information on epidemiological investigation sub-
jects from handwritten to computerized data, real-time infor-
mation exchange between institutions has become possible.81 
The SMS is a modified system that ensures the speed and effi-
ciency of epidemiological investigations and has enabled the 
Infectious Disease Control Agency to quickly respond to the 
spread of COVID-19.20
The use of personal information via SMS is based on Article 
76-2 of the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, where 
the Central Disease Control Headquarters can request police 
offices to obtain relevant information without the consent of an 
individual. Access rights to the information collected by this 
system are limited to epidemiological investigators.81
Treatment and management
Reshaping hospitals: National Safe Hospitals
To prevent cross-infection of COVID-19 among patients who 
visit medical institutions, the MOHW has been designating and 
operating National Safe Hospitals (public relief hospitals) from 
February 22, 2020. A National Safe Hospital is a facility where 
patients with respiratory symptoms and other patients can re-
ceive treatment separately during the entire treatment process, 
from visit to discharge.82,83 National Safe Hospitals are jointly 
managed by the MOHW and the Korea Hospital Association 
and are required to be adequately qualified in terms of size, 
structure, and operation.82 Depending on the status of COV-
ID-19 and changes in management policies, the qualifications 
for a National Safety Hospital may change, as can principles of 
operation.84 In the hospitalization and emergency room, visits 
from individuals other than guardians are completely controlled, 
and only one guardian who follows required procedures can 
enter. All guardians who are permitted to enter are asked to ob-
serve infection prevention protocols, such as personal hygiene 
and cough etiquette.84
Increase patient capacity: Residential treatment centers 
Residential treatment centers are public facilities that manage 
patients with mild COVID-19 who do not require inpatient treat-
ment. Residential treatment centers employ medical staff and 
support staff on-site 24 hours a day to provide medical care and 
living support to patients isolated in the facility. Residents self-
monitor their body temperature and respiratory symptoms 
twice daily, and in case symptoms worsen, they can be trans-
ferred to National Safe Hospitals at the discretion of the medi-
cal staff. These centers are mainly operated by utilizing educa-
tion and training facilities owned by government and private 
companies, university dormitories, hotels, etc. and open and 
close flexibly according to the remaining number of local hos-
pital beds.85,86
Patients admitted to a residential treatment center can be dis-
charged if they have no fever or clinical symptoms 7 days after 
diagnosis and have had two consecutive negative COVID-19 
test results obtained within an interval of 24-hour. In addition, 
if at least one of two diagnostic tests is positive or indeterminate, 
a re-test is performed after 7 days, and discharge is allowed after 
two consecutive negative tests within an interval of 24-hour. 
However, on June 24, 2020, as the criteria for quarantine for 
COVID-19 patients were relaxed, the conditions for discharge 
from a residential treatment center were also changed. Accord-
ing to the revised criteria, discharge is possible even if only one 
of the clinical symptoms has disappeared and PCR test results 
are met.87
Based on the results of the initial 2 weeks of operation report-
ed by the Gyeongbuk-Daegu 7 residential treatment center, one 
of the largest, seven patients were transported to the hospital 
due to worsening symptoms, and 107 were discharged without 
complications. No cases of patients being hospitalized for mild 
disease that worsened or cases of cross-infection to healthcare 
providers were reported.88 Residential treatment centers can be 
a useful alternative for efficient distribution of medical re-
sources in the COVID-19 pandemic. By using this facility, it is 
possible to address severe medical resource shortages by uti-
lizing facilities that already exist in the community and to en-
able management according to the severity of the patient.85,88
Distribution of medical supplies to institutions
From March 19, 2020, the National Health Insurance Corpo-
ration has maintained a medical supplies platform to resolve 
supply-demand imbalances for medical devices and supplies 
(https://medicare.nhis.or.kr). The platform service can be used 
by both medical institutions and product manufacturers/sell-
ers, and information can be shared in real time by accessing and 
entering the type and quantity of medical supplies required or 
available for supply, respectively. Information about personal 
protective equipment, including protective clothing, medical 
devices (mobile X-ray, CT, thermometer, ultrasound, electron-
ic stethoscope, manual patient carrier), pharmaceuticals (anti-
viral, antimalarial), and mobile negative pressure devices is 
provided.89
Risk communication
The Central Disease Control Headquarters announces infor-
mation on COVID-19 every day at 9:30 AM and 2:00 PM (24 
hours from 0:00 on the day) to guarantee the public’s right to 
know as much as possible. The contents of the announcements 
include regional and national statistics on the number of con-
firmed patients, deaths, diagnostic tests, and releases from 
quarantine. In the event of a confirmed case of COVID-19, in-
786
COVID-19 Response in the Republic of Korea
https://doi.org/10.3349/ymj.2021.62.9.777
formation about their route of movement, transportation used, 
and places visited 2 days before disease onset are promptly dis-
closed via the MOHW website, communication networks, and 
press releases. In principle, information specific to an individ-
ual, such as sex, age, nationality, place of residence, and name 
of the place of work, is not disclosed.
Real-time disclosure of information using an open application 
program interface service 
To respond to COVID-19, the government of the ROK has re-
leased various types of open data in the form of an open appli-
cation program interface (API). The disclosed data are repro-
cessed into a dataset that can quickly divulge information under 
the voluntary participation of information technology devel-
opers and citizens. Services that are open to the private sector 
in the form of websites or applications have been developed 
(Table 3).80
In March 2020, the HIRA released open API data to provide 
information on National Safe Hospitals and Screening Centers 
through a public data portal. Using the information collected 
from the API, the MOHW can disclose the state of operation of 
institutions for the diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19 na-
tionwide through its official website in real time. Furthermore, 
the MOHW provides daily data related to confirmed COVID-19 
cases. Utilizing this public data, many developers have volun-
tarily introduced technical services that provide integrated in-
formation to the public. In particular, services that visualize the 
information of confirmed cases of COVID-19 as maps are widely 
used by the public.90
Response to public anxiety on mask shortages
As the supply of masks continued to be unable to keep up with 
rapidly increasing demand due to increases in the number of 
COVID-19 confirmed cases, the Ministry of Food and Drug 
Safety enacted “Emergency Adjustment Measures for Supply 
and Demand of Filtering Respirators and Hand Sanitizers” on 
February 12 and 26.91,92 These were implemented as part of the 
“Emergency Supply and Demand Adjustment Measures” in 
accordance with Article 6 of the Price Stabilization Act, which 
was the first adjustment measure taken 44 years after the pro-
visions were enacted:93,94 if there is a risk of harming the peo-
ple’s livelihood due to a sharp inflation or insufficient supply of 
goods, the government may enact emergency supply and de-
mand adjustment measures to business owners or importers/
exporters within a period of 5 months. Through two measures, 
the distribution structure of masks was made transparent by 
mandating reporting of production volume, sales volume, and 
selling price by producers and sellers, and export restrictions 
(exports in the range of 10% of production volume) were imple-
mented to expand domestic supply.91,95 Nevertheless, as the 
mask supply and demand was not resolved, the government of 
the ROK implemented a revision of the emergency mask sup-
ply and demand adjustment measures on March 6, 2020. The 
main content of this measure was the expansion of the manda-
tory public supply of health masks (to 80%) and the suspension 
of mask exports. In addition, to secure masks quickly and stably, 
the government unified the contracting entity of public quantity 
masks as a Public Procurement Service. From this time onward, 
the production and distribution of masks has been managed by 
the government, not the market.96 
To stabilize the supply and demand of health masks, the gov-
ernment has limited the number of masks that could be pur-
chased per person from March 9, 2020 to two per week (in-
creased to three from April 27, 2020). The places where masks 
can be sold were limited to pharmacies, the National Agricul-
tural Cooperative Federation (excluding the capital area), and 
post offices (located in towns and villages) nationwide. Dur-
ing the period when restrictions on the public supply of health 
masks was in effect, the government provided information on 
the sale of masks to the open API (from March 10, 2020).96 In-
formation disclosure was conducted by collecting data related 
to wearing and selling masks for each vendor by the HIRA and 
then publishing them to the public data portal of the National 
Information Society Agency (NIA). The data provided by the 
NIA reprocessed and released via an open API, and private app 
developers disclosed various services that can effectively pro-
vide real-time information, such as where to masks are sold 
and how much they have in stock, to consumers.80 The above-
Table 3. Data Disclosed in Open Application Program Interface Services
Service Information Open API Provider
Institutions offering diagnosis 
and treatment
Clinics and operating hours by region, possible 
procedures, contact information, and location 
(including map service); possible to search data 
by integrating data pertaining to administrative 
region, institution name, and phone number
https://www.data.go.kr/
data/15043078/openapi.do





Basic information of confirmed cases (sex, age, 





Publicly-distributed face mask 
information (service 
interrupted)
Mask seller, type of institution, address, date of 






MOHW, Ministry of Health and Welfare.
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mentioned measures were officially abolished in July 2020 as 
the acquisition of raw materials stabilized and as the capabili-
ties of mask production facilities increased.
CONCLUSION
Korea’s COVID-19 pandemic management has been based on 
a strong central agency capable of making agile and respon-
sive policy decisions, engaging in active public-private sector 
partnership, and providing surveillance and responses via inte-
grated information management systems. The large-scale avail-
ability of diagnostic testing, a prerequisite for prevention, was 
made possible by the presence of fast and highly accurate re-
agents developed as a result of government investments in R&D 
and technology sharing with private developers. Epidemio-
logical investigation systems have been successful because in-
formation sharing between related ministries was made possi-
ble via information and communication technology capable 
of supporting a large-scale database. In addition, the govern-
ment has provided quarantine-related data to the private sec-
tor, and private companies have used these data to develop ser-
vices that better reflect the needs of the public, increasing public 
access to information. Moreover, the ROK has attempted to 
implement new innovative measures to compensate for short-
comings in existing quarantine systems. In particular, a drive-
thru screening center capable of large-scale diagnostic testing 
and residential treatment centers, a treatment facility for pa-
tients with mild COVID-19, the first of its kind in the world, were 
developed and put into operation. This was made possible by 
reflecting on past experiences. 
As of May 31, 2021, the cumulative number of the COV-
ID-19 cases in the ROK has reached 142157 (0.28% of the popu-
lation; ranking 154th in the world).3,97 This relatively small num-
ber of the infections may stem from the government's proactive 
responses based on governance and public-private partner-
ship, in addition to citizen compliance with the government’s 
policies. Although the success of the initial response to the pan-
demic does not necessarily guarantee a faster return to nor-
malcy, it may have allowed sufficient time to prepare for long-
term responses including pharmaceutical interventions. 
Above all, we hope that our experience and know-how can 
be passed on to other developing economies that are fighting 
COVID-19. As part of the same Asian Development Bank proj-
ect, we will examine initial responses to COVID-19 in the ROK; 
Singapore; and Taipei,China and compare differences in four 
aspects: governance, health, economy, and society.
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